credit, over-indebtedness and financial inclusion. There has also been an increasing "internationalisation" of regulatory models: this diffusion occurs through regional initiatives, 12 the influence of international institutions, legal transplants, and the practices of international financial institutions. 13 The World Bank has outlined a model of consumer protection in financial services.
14 Assumptions about the function of consumer credit in contemporary economies will affect the form of regulation. Consumer credit performs several functions. It facilitates consumerism, compensates for stagnant growth in wages, and may smooth fluctuations in income and substitute for social spending in economies with limited social provision 15 . Credit may purchase therefore not only "private" consumer goods and services but also public goods such as education . Mortgage credit is a key to home ownership ---in turn a key to other services such as education-and of great social importance in many countries 16 . Consumer credit may contribute to an individual's capability in society. 17 Consumer credit is therefore a central aspect of contemporary economies, part of the financialisation 18 of modern life. The consequences of a credit crunch are significant for many groups-both middle and lower income consumers.
A society organised around a high level of consumerism and limited public provision will inevitably result in high levels of consumer credit. The US provides the historical experiment of a "consumers' republic" where high levels of consumption facilitated by low cost mortgages and taxsubsidised consumer credit were intended to ensure high employment and productivity and provide equality through consumption without the necessity for a substantial welfare state. 19 Lizabeth Cohen ticket" to consumer citizenship and prosperity. This model was adopted about a generation later in the UK during the 1970s and 1980s along with a transition from producerism to consumerism in politics and cutbacks in the welfare state. In contrast, several continental European countries continue to have lower levels of consumer credit than the UK and higher levels of social security.
There remain significant differences in levels of consumer credit and approaches to regulation of consumer credit in the EU with contrasts drawn between "Anglo Saxon" approaches to regulation which emphasise freedom to obtain credit and countries such as France and Germany which are more likely to protect an individual from the credit market . The institutional framework of credit markets and regulation also differ within Europe concerning issues such as the role of credit bureaux, the use of interest rate ceilings, credit card practices and regulation, the availability of home mortgage loans and the size of the non-profit financial sector. These differences, which may reflect legal origins 20 , political economy , 21 or distinct approaches to consumerism 22 , challenge the ambition to create an integrated EU credit market which achieves both a competitive market and the social goals of financial inclusion and affordable access to credit. The relative balance between these goals and the role of regulation in the European market is not merely a technical problem. There is also political competition in the internationalisation of national models of regulation. Until recently the UK compared its model of credit regulation favourably with other countries, claiming for example that restrictive German consumer credit legislation had contributed to the sluggish growth of the German economy. 23 While this may seem now like hubris, it highlights the need for careful comparative study to understand the assumptions, norms and effects of distinct regulatory regimes. There are two basic conceptualisations of credit regulation in contemporary policy literature. The first is to treat it as a "private" commodity. Even within this conceptualisation there may be substantial scope for regulation based on market failures(information, externalities) on the supply and demand side. Warren and Bar Gill argue that credit products like toasters should meet minimum safety requirements and their safety should be regulated through similar techniques (information, warnings, standards, recalls, bans) to those adopted for other consumer products. A second approach is to view credit services as a service of general interest-as a necessary part of life-and subject to public service obligations. In developed countries financial exclusion -where individuals do not have access to the financial system or have restricted access to only high cost credit -may lead to social exclusion and undermine tax and welfare redistributions. Access to affordable credit may not be a human right but ideas associated with services of general interest such as equality of access, nondiscriminatory treatment and corporate social responsibility to clients might be argued as affecting regulation of credit markets and underpin a conception of responsible lending. 24 Gowan sets forth three reasons for treating financial services as a public utility: they are vital public services and inherently unstable; policy questions concerning the channelling of credit to industrial or consumer use raise issues of great economic and social significance; and financial services should be subject to democratic control.
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24 See Commission of the EU Green Paper on services of general economic interest COM (2003) 270. The EU classifies services of general interest as services of an economic nature" which are "subject to public service obligations". The EU does not currently classify financial services as a service of general interest. 25 Gowan op cit.
Alternative classifications of consumer credit affect our understanding of the credit contract and the role of lenders and borrowers. If credit is a service of general interest then "responsible lending"-an influential concept in many reform initiatives 26 ---could include not only an obligation on financial service providers to be prudent lenders but also to reach out to groups which are underserved. Three methods to achieve this objective appear in existing literature. 27 First there is the promotion of non-profit institutions such as credit unions (savings banks in Germany, France and Spain). A second approach is to encourage mainstream banks to ensure access to excluded groups. This may be achieved through embedding public obligations as a ground rule of the banking system. Third, the state might provide a dedicated fund as in the UK where small loans may be made available through state agencies such as the social fund. The UK has rejected imposing obligations on mainstream financial institutions and has promoted the "third sector" of credit unions and community initiatives 28 .
We do not explore these issues at length in this paper but we believe that public obligations should be embedded in the mainstream financial system using the model (if not the actual practice) of the US Community Reinvestment Act. George Gloukoviezoff has recently argued for a general "solidary objective" to be written into the objectives of the financial system 29 . This would be a true "Third Way" between dominant forms of regulation (financial literacy, better disclosures, and credit data sharing) and state redistribution. Georges Gloukoviezoff argues that solidary outcome objectives would be required for the banking system but banks would not be required to meet these objectives. However, if they failed to do so they would have to make a financial contribution to those who had met the objectives. This would make it less efficient to practice financial exclusion and would promote a more cooperative capitalism. The recent EU report on Financial Exclusion proposes a similar plan that there should be a compensatory financing mechanism for those banks which provide universal services so that they are not disadvantaged competitively 30 . We think that this model should be considered seriously in the UK where UK Financial Investments Limited has already imposed an obligation to lend on financial institutions in which it has a financial stake 31 .
In this paper we take the fundamental issues in credit to be those of availability and safety and examine an influential international model of consumer credit regulation, identified by the World Bank, which we characterise as a neo-liberal approach to regulation. However even within this model public regulation of consumer credit markets is accepted as necessary to achieve public confidence and achieve fairness. The recent US proposal to create a Consumer Financial Protection 26 Responsible lending was highlighted in the initial draft of the recent EU consumer credit directive. This draft included a suitability of credit requirement along with an obligation on creditors to check credit databases and reflected the Belgian approach to credit regulation. This provision was ultimately watered down to an obligation to explain and advise on credit options so that a consumer is in a position to make an informed decision, and to check credit databases where appropriate. See arts 5, and 8. Recital 26 of the Directive states that governments should promote responsible lending practices throughout the lending transaction "Irresponsible lending" is a factor to take into account in determining whether to grant or revoke a credit licence in the UK The National Credit Act of South Africa 2005 prohibits "reckless lending" (see ss 78-81) 27 Agency is intriguing since a form of this regulation already exists in the UK in the overlapping jurisdiction of the UK Office of Fair Trading and Financial Services Authority over credit markets and we examine the recent regulation of sub-prime lending and payment protection insurance by the FSA. We conclude that this may provide a promising model for future credit regulation, but will not solve the problem of achieving affordable access to credit.
A final preliminary point concerns the variety of explanations for the contemporary global financial crisis. 32 One strand of explanation links the credit crunch to consumer profligacy-the idea that there has been a "credit binge" during the past decade in countries such as the UK and the US in the service of rampant consumerism. Avner Offer develops a more elegant explanation, arguing that consumer overspending represents a pathology of affluent societies. 33 However this is a partial picture. Much credit was used to upgrade assets that were perceived would increase in value (homes). The liberal availability of consumer credit and the housing boom during the late 1990s in the UK compensated for the downward pressure on wages created by free trade and the ability since the 1970s of capital to free itself of labour power, through for example the abolition of controls on the mobility of capital. 34 Free trade also provided cheap imports which could be financed by credit. The rise of securitisation, linking the capital and credit markets, provided a continuing demand from the capital markets for high yield consumer credit receivables, which would meet the needs of high shortterm returns in a shareholder driven capitalism. 35 While credit might lead to short term growth, this was consumption rather than investment driven and was ultimately unstable. 36 The sources of problems in the credit markets are primarily on the supply side of the market and a government committed to an economy driven by consumer credit.
II Neo-Liberal Approaches to Regulation
Neo-liberal regulation promotes access to consumer credit and the creation of confidence in an expanding and competitive consumer credit market. Consumer choice and the promotion of individual management and responsibility for one's finances are assumptions guiding regulation. Regulation within neo-liberalism assumes that consumer credit is beneficial by permitting income smoothing over an individual's life cycle, for example permitting younger consumers to accumulate assets during periods of low income and addressing temporary income deficits. 37 Facilitating access to consumer credit may also contribute, albeit indirectly, to alleviating poverty in developing countries.
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The promotion of fairness in credit contracts is not, in itself, incompatible with neo-liberalism since a fair market promotes confidence and expansion of the market. The central institutions and policies advocated for consumer credit markets within neoliberalism are: (1) credit bureaux and positive credit reporting, (2) truth in lending, (3) financial literacy, and (4) financial ombudsmen.
39 Securitization was also promoted as a measure to increase liquidity particularly in developing countries but the institutional structure of securitization created dangers for consumers and contributed to the instability of financial markets. Its future within consumer lending remains uncertain. The four institutions outlined above respond to information asymmetries facing both suppliers and borrowers and are intended to recreate the conditions of a perfect market. Ombudsmen address individual enforcement costs. These regulations will create what the World Bank describes as the optimal "rules of engagement" for creditors and debtors. This model assumes that it is possible to reduce the imbalance between consumers and providers by recreating the conditions of a neo-classical market-addressing informational market failures and redress costs. The premises of UK consumer policy (and the World Bank) are that the discipline of "empowered" consumers will drive a virtuous circle of increased competition, innovation and productivity.
Neo-liberalism is often associated with individualised enforcement through private rights. However, the need to maintain consumer confidence and the legitimacy of the credit system in the face of market failures and scandals often results in pressure for regulation and what Harvey describes as the paradox of "intense state intervention" primarily through experts " in a world where the state is supposed not to be interventionist". 40 In the UK there is ex ante control of suppliers' access to the market.
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A neo-liberal model must also deal with the inevitable problem of default in a society committed to high levels of credit. In the business context the World Bank, influenced by the law and finance literature, underlines the importance of clear and easily enforced creditor rights in encouraging general credit availability. 42 It is relatively silent on the treatment of consumer overindebtedness. In the consumer context the potential social costs of overindebtedness for a debtor and third parties may not be accurately priced in the original transaction. If creditors are repeat players and are able to develop systematic advantages in using the courts as part of a collection routine there is a danger that rapid enforcement which does not scrutinise closely the validity of the underlying debt will result in overlending and the sanctioning of sharp practice. 43 The system for regulating default may affect the perimeters of credit although the empirical effects of debtororiented or creditor-oriented rules on secured and unsecured consumer credit granting remains contested. 44 and create a model of how each party should treat the other throughout the transaction. The World Bank is relatively cursory in its discussion of the ground rules of consumer credit contracts. It recognises the necessity of ground rules for credit contracts, including controls on default rates as part of an effective consumer protection framework. However it cautions that such regulation might restrict contractual freedom "to make contracts that may in some cases be more appropriate".
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Neo-liberalism is sceptical of using market rules to redistribute the costs of market transactions, for example, through interest rate ceilings 46 . Any redistribution should be made by the state through the tax and transfer system. In addition, direct product regulation is shunned as a limit on innovation. .
Neo-liberalism does not mean therefore the absence of regulation. Nor is it limited to an "informational" approach to consumer protection. This ideal type of neo-liberalism is often associated with Anglo-Saxon (common law) jurisdictions such as the UK and the US. French civil law jurisdictions, it is argued, are more likely to protect an individual from the market. However, in practice even within Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions there are often political pressure for regulation of consumer credit. The elasticity of the market failure concept and the need to respond to scandals and outrages (e.g. concerns about "loan sharks") and maintain the legitimacy of the financial system may result in a significant regulatory response 47 . In societies of high inequality such as the UK and the US, where low income consumers pay much higher credit costs than middle class consumers, thereby undermining the impact of state transfers, the legitimacy of the credit system is always open to criticism.
Challenges for neo-liberalism
Competition for innovation or exploitation of behavioural biases?
A neo-liberal model assumes that more competition is a good thing for consumer markets. But aggressive competition in the credit market poses challenges for regulators. Given the long term nature of many credit relationships and the often short term behavioural biases of consumers, competition may often focus on the short term costs and contingencies rather than long term or lower probability events such as default costs. The case of credit cards is a well known example where firms may exploit consumers' behavioural biases---individuals underestimate their future borrowing on cards-and competition focuses on short term benefits such as no annual fees with high prices on 44 47 For example, in the UK in the early 2000s, the media highlighted the case of a couple whose mortgage loan had ballooned from £5000 to £348,000 because of compound interest on arrears. Questions were asked in Parliament and politicians promised to "do something" about "loan sharks".
longer term contingencies such as borrowing costs and default charges. 48 Bar-Gill has drawn attention to the potentially regressive and socially harmful aspects of this form of pricing. This general structure of pricing seems to exist in both prime and sub-prime consumer credit markets and was a subject of much criticism in the early 2000s . 49 The Competition Commission concluded that high cost payment protection insurance might be compensating for low margins on credit prices.
It is possible that what Barr, Mullainathan and Shafir describe as "high road" firms-those who view themselves as good corporate citizens-may not wish to adopt these pricing practices. However, they do so because they fear being at a competitive disadvantage in a market where it is difficult to correct consumers short term preferences and convince them that an alternative product, for example a credit card with an annual fee and lower interest might be more suitable. 50 The behavioural literature also challenges the view that consumer choices always reflect consumer preferences. A common argument against regulation of sub-prime lending practices such as payday loans is that it interferes with individual choice. But if choices do not always reflect preferences then the argument against regulation becomes weaker and undermines any a priori presumptions against regulation based on abstract concepts such as markets versus regulation. A close scrutiny of the potential harmful effects of biases in particular credit markets particularly the higher costs of credit mistakes for lower income consumers may justify regulation.
The behavioural literature has stimulated several distinct policy responses. First, there is the search for debiasing interventions through more imaginative disclosures and the exploitation of behavioural findings to design more effective "choice architectures" 51 for consumers. Although to understanding and measuring policy alternatives does not promise clear solutions and may increase uncertainty as to what might work. Second, information policies might be supplemented by changing default rules, requiring a consumer to affirmatively opt in to an increase in a credit limit. This approach retains consumer choice and autonomy, best described by Sunstein and Thaler as a form of libertarian paternalism 53 . Barr et al propose a"behaviourally informed financial regulation". This would be a Third Way approach going beyond what they perceive as a traditional dichotomy between either reliance on disclosure regulation or the use of usury ceilings. Their approach takes into account both behavioural biases and market analysis. They propose " sticky" default rules such as a standardised sub prime mortgage product without high costs attached to long term contingencies. Consumers could opt out but only if there are both heightened disclosures and a substantial legal liability on the provider if the loan turns out to be not appropriate for the borrower. This would permit innovation but only where it could be credibly explained to a potential borrower.
A third response to information deficits is greater standardisation of subsidiary terms in credit contracts where there is unlikely to be substantial competition between providers and/or where individuals are unlikely to be able to assess the risks of the term in advance. 54 Standardisation already exists in some financial contracts and the OFT has standardised default charges in credit cards. 55 The argument that standardisation stifles innovation and limits consumer choice should not be discarded but a greater burden might be placed on providers to substantiate these arguments. Standardisation might represent a "collective hands tying". For example, in an expanding competitive credit market few firms will stick to requiring downpayments from consumers even if individually they would deem it wise to do so. Finance Houses indicated to the Crowther committee that they supported the regulation of credit terms including required down payments in order to "protect a great many fools from their folly" but that they could not do so by voluntary agreement among themselves. Australia] have lower levels of consumer credit outstanding than countries such as the UK and the US. Negative credit reporting may be expected to produce greater incentives to repay because in a positive system a borrower knows that one default may be discounted by a lender with a full picture of the financial position of the borrower.
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Credit information is not merely used to minimise risk but also to maximise profits 64 .
Information may be used by credit card companies to segment markets, develop "behavioural scorecards" and target consumers who are likely to generate high profits through late payments and borrowing on a card. Less profitable consumers may be terminated. Thus the Egg credit card company terminated contracts with those customers who did not use the card frequently and regularly paid off their balances. Ronald Mann argues that through increased segmentation of the credit card market companies target some consumers with high fees while attempting to profit from higher income consumers through affinity cards with relatively high annual fees, whose benefits consumers often mistakenly assume outweigh their costs 65 . During the 1990s it was argued in the UK that credit scoring was used in the UK to exclude individuals from mainstream markets and facilitated the development of sub-prime lending. 66 Most recently credit card companies use risk based pricing to change the interest rate (sometimes by as much as 10%) for existing holders of cards.
Extensive information sharing may facilitate a deeper consumer credit market but not necessarily result in lower levels of indebtedness or even default. One study claims that 'countries with positive registries such as the UK, the US and Sweden…have high levels of indebtedness' 67 .
These comments suggest some ambiguity about the overall effects of more creditor information: greater competition that could create incentives to 'oversell', more access to credit but not necessarily a reduction in the level of default. Positive credit reporting therefore has ambiguous effects: more lending, to possibly higher risk consumers but also the possibility of higher defaults as lenders use scoring as a method of increasing profitability rather than reducing risk.
Credit scoring also facilitates forms of lending where lending is centralized, staff costs are reduced through the absence of face-to-face contact through branches and credit processing is computerized. This may reduce the possibility of determining whether credit is suitable or appropriate to the needs of a particular individual rather than the profit maximisation of the lender There is therefore a tension between this form of credit granting and the development of an individualised responsible lending standard.
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There is remarkably little "hard" regulation of several aspects of credit bureaux and credit scoring practices in the UK 69 notwithstanding their central role in segmenting, including and excluding individuals from the credit market. .
Upskilling consumers through financial literacy?
During the past 10 years governments, other regulators and international institutions have joined with financial firms to promote financial literacy as a core element of consumer financial services market regulation. This development illuminates how neoliberal policy-making organises consumer protection policy around individualization, responsibilization and market expansion. 74 Although the particular mandates and specific goals of these initiatives vary, it is common for their work to be characterised as "empowering consumers" at a minimum through the provision of information, the development of financial skills and the activation of a consumers' sense of financial responsibility. 75 These policy initiatives link the enhancement of consumers' financial capabilities to their responsibilization through the idea that financial literacy improves the capacity of consumers to protect themselves against risks of "mis-buying" and misselling of financial products. A second important linkage is the idea that financial literacy fuels demand for financial products as consumers become more active and more self-reliant -that is, more self-regulating -about how they manage income smoothing and their future economic security. As consumers become more capable and therefore responsible they in turn are supposed to reduce the need for regulatory intervention. ) headlines its section titled "What we want to achieve" with "We share a vision of better informed, educated and more confident citizens, able to take greater responsibility for their financial affairs and play a more active role in the market for financial services", at 2.
Financial literacy has become almost an international crusade and it is difficult to find balanced discussion of its role in financial services. The idea of "responsibilizing" consumers by upgrading their financial capabilities fits neatly into strategies of governance in neoliberalism where suitably upgraded consumers in the credit market will become part of the supposed virtuous circle of driving competition, innovation and productivity in financial services. Consumers will also, it is argued, be able to avoid the problems of overindebtedness through better financial management. Financial literacy has become part of the professional discourse of policy makers and the helping professions. There remains however much that is untested in the financial literacy literature and a review of behavioural finance suggests that it is not absence of information but behavioural biases which cause consumers to make repeated mistakes in credit markets 76 .
Low cost redress: financial ombudsmen
A financial ombudsman disposes of disputes between consumers, small businesses and financial institutions. The financial ombudsman has become an international institution, since its emergence in the UK in the early 1980s. 77 Its characteristics are its ability to determine issues on broad fairness grounds, specialist knowledge, the absence of costs to consumers, the requirement for firms to develop internal complaint systems, and the possibility of identifying patterns of misconduct which can be addressed by regulators. An ombudsman can be therefore part of a meta-regulatory strategy to ensure the responsiveness of large organisations.
Experience in the UK indicates that the FOS has provided a useful service to primarily middle and upper middle class consumers 78 
III. A Consumer Credit Safety Commission? The UK Regulatory Triangle
Bar-Gill and Warren proposed a "new deal" consumer credit safety commission which would provide ex ante credit product regulation, with the possibility of rulemaking and regulation of the product rather than particular sellers. 79 This model has been adopted by the Obama administration in the proposal to establish a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency 80 . A variation on this model already exists in the UK where the OFT licenses unsecured credit providers and the FSA secured credit providers. Both the OFT and the FSA now have the power to monitor and regulate the business model of credit providers and the addition of irresponsible lending to the criteria for licence revocation provides the OFT with a significant lever for regulating lending practices throughout the course of a transaction. 78 The 2008 Annual Review indicates increasing numbers of consumers using the service in the C1 and C2 categories reflecting the growth of its consumer credit jurisdiction and the decline in mortgage endowment cases. 79 "Making Credit Safer" op cit. 80 For the details see the US White Paper of June 17 2009 "Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation" at 55et seq 81 The 2006 amendments to the 1974 Act now permit the OFT to take into account the business model of a firm in assessing its fitness to hold a licence and "irresponsible lending" is included as a criterion in deciding whether to grant or revoke a credit licence. See CCA s25 (2), (2A(e) and (2B). The OFT is under an obligation
Credit licensing by the OFT in the UK had both efficiency and distributional objectives. From an efficiency perspective licensing compensated for general information and enforcement costs facing consumers. The distributional goal was the protection of lower income and vulnerable consumers who would have difficulties in seeking individual remedies against unfair credit practices. The licensing provisions under the 1974 Act did confer broad powers on the OFT to police "unfair practices" irrespective of whether they were proscribed by law. The Annual Reports of the OFT during the 1980s and 90s indicates that they used the licensing process as a method of identifying unfair practices, for example developing guidelines on unfair practices in the sub-prime (non-status) lending market. These practices included irresponsible lending, the use of dual interest rates, and negative option selling of credit insurance. The licensing process did function therefore as a nascent form of industry rulemaking of credit products. The perception was however that the OFTs information gathering and enforcement powers and practices were not effective and that the agency was underresourced . Although self-regulation also developed during this period, its coverage was least effective in higher risk lending. There was also little political support for the OFT during the 1990s while the Conservative government was in power. Indeed reform during this period focused on whether the costs of licensing (overinclusive and costly to administer) outweighed its benefits 82 .
In contrast the regulatory impact analysis for the 2006 amendments to the CCA concluded that the costs to consumers and reputable businesses from deregulation would far outweigh the costs saved through deregulation. 
The OFT has also engaged in credit industry rulemaking through its general power to enforce unfair contract terms under the UTCC regulations implementing the EU Directive. Thus it has set the terms for default rates on credit cards and currently is engaged in regulation of overdraft charges. 84 The new OFT licensing model is based on the licensing powers of the Financial Services Authority whose jurisdiction since 2004 includes first charge mortgages and credit insurance. Retail financial services are regulated through conduct of business rules but in recent years the FSA adopted what regulatory scholars describe as a meta-regulatory approach, requiring financial firms to embed general principles such as "treating customers fairly" within their business model and organisational culture. It now refers to this form of regulation as "outcomes based" regulation and treating customers fairly requires a number of "consumer outcomes" 85 . These include: "consumers can be confident that they are dealing with firms where the fair treatment of customers is central to corporate culture and is automatically taken into account in all relevant business decisions"; "products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are designed to meet the needs of identified consumer groups and are targeted accordingly": and "consumers are provided with products that perform as firms have led them to expect and the associated service is both of an acceptable standard and as they have been led to expect". The FSA expects fair treatment to be "established throughout the firm not just in systems and controls but in business culture including strategy, training, remuneration, and 84 See discussion in Ramsay "Consumer Law and Policy" op cit at 476-485. 85 See FSA "Treating Customers Fairly: Measuring Outcomes" (2007) which lists the six consumer outcomes.
staff behaviours". Senior management must have adequate information to monitor TCF. Firms must not rely solely on consumer satisfaction studies to determine whether there is fair treatment of consumers since consumers may be satisfied with an unsuitable product and dissatisfied with a fair product. The FSA's approach does not depend on prescriptive rules and action against deviant firms but is intended to embed attentiveness to consumer welfare into the working rules of financial product design, development and marketing and financial contract formation, performance, complaint handling and redress. While this approach ultimately harnesses self-regulation the FSA has been active in inspecting firms to identify progress with its initiative and taking enforcement action where it identifies significant violations of the principles.
The FSA has been active in its regulation of the sub-prime credit industry since taking over this jurisdiction in 2004. In 2005 the FSA highlighted to firms the importance of making a suitability assessment and treating consumers fairly when selling payment protection insurance 86 . The 2005 review concluded that many firms visited had inadequate documentation to demonstrate suitability when advising on mortgage products. The Authority responded through individual feedback, a "dear CEO letter" and enforcement actions. In 2007 it conducted a further review of substantial numbers of lenders and intermediaries in the sub prime lending market . The review revealed that in the case of intermediaries one third of files showed an inadequate assessment of consumers' ability to afford the mortgage and in almost half the files there was an inadequate assessment of customers' suitability for the mortgage. "Significant numbers of consumers were advised to re-mortgage, thereby incurring early repayment charges, without the adviser being able to demonstrate that this was beneficial to the customer. None of the lenders adequately covered all relevant responsible lending considerations in their policies" and " there were also failings by lenders to monitor the application of their policies, which resulted in the approval of potentially unaffordable mortgages." Five firm were referred for enforcement action. of HSBC was fined over £1 million for its misselling practices. It sold single premium insurance with 75% of its consumer loans which are primarily made to working class and lower middle income consumers. The investigation by the FSA of its internal practices revealed that its procedures for training and monitoring staff were inadequate and that these resulted in an "unacceptable risk of unsuitable sales". The need to monitor staff was heightened by the existence of a bonus structure for meeting sales targets of PPI. In addition to a substantial fine, HFC undertook an independent audit of its compliance and contacted consumers who may have been missold insurance to identify possible compensation. 90 The report of the FSA action also revealed the business model of HFC which involved much refinancing of loans which provided opportunities for selling larger loans, more insurance, and settlement fees. The FSA has now required all firms not to sell single premium payment protection insurance. 91 A consequence of these and other investigations (by the Competition Commission) is that payment protection insurance may no longer be a major supra-normal profit centre for financial institutions. 92 The demise of single premium ppi might be analogised to recall of a potentially dangerous product.
There are several points of interest in the FSAs approach to regulation. First, it is a form of ex ante regulation in the sense that firms must not market dangerous products or have marketing structures that create an unreasonable risk of misselling. Second, the regulator opens up the black box of corporate decision making, requiring firms to develop a business model which does not create this unacceptable risk.. Third,, the FSA has significant informational and monitoring powers. Firms must make monthly reports and are subject to audit visits particularly if they are operating in a potentially higher risk sector. Fourth, the agency has the power to award redress and in a number of cases required companies to write to existing customers with policies outlining the possibility of redress.
93 Fifth, the FSA has gradations of penalties ranging from informal feedback, "dear CEO letters", through financial penalties and the possibility of licence revocation.
The FSA approach is a potentially promising model of consumer credit regulation. However we are aware of potential criticisms . First, Baldwin has pointed to the difficulties of regulators attempting to harness internal organisational structures where there may be confusion and conflict over roles and a tension between shareholder return and regulatory risk. 94 The continued misselling of ppi by large "reputable" organizations after being warned of the dangers by the regulator and in some cases the receipt of a "Dear CEO" letter might support Baldwin's argument or simply suggest that these firms were amoral calculators and therefore unlikely to be able to change their culture. Second, there is the perennial problem of "capture" of agencies by particular interests. This concern has underpinned much UK regulatory thinking during the past decade with the growth of a variety of accountability mechanisms within government and in the case of the FSA the existence of the Financial Services Consumer Panel. 95 . There is little evidence of capture of the agency by any single interest group and the capture theory does not in any event adequately describe the complex interdependence between powerful actors in particular regulatory spaces where "no single actor can hope to dominate the regulatory process" 96 .
There is also the role of the FOS and the OFT within the regulatory structure. The former can play an informational role in identifying potentially unfair credit practices in its dispute settlement work and acting as a catalyst for regulatory action. Financial service companies must establish 90 The decision indicates: "As a result of the review HFC is in the process of making a significant number of changes to its sales processes. It has also agreed to strengthen its compliance monitoring and oversight arrangements. HFC has also committed to a robust remedial action plan, overseen by third party accountants, involving a programme of customer contact and, if appropriate, steps to ensure that its customers are not disadvantaged. appropriate complaints procedures. The existence of the OFT with some overlapping jurisdiction provides the possibility of regulatory competition and the existence of regulatory redundancy. This UK regulatory triangle is complemented by the existence of the "supercomplaints" process which permits consumer groups to place issues [such as ppi] on the regulatory agenda 97 . Third regulators, like consumers, might also be affected by behavioural biases with the danger that they were overconfident in their judgments, responding to highly visible (though not necessarily serious) issues. There are however significant controls on this in contemporary UK regulation through the requirements of RIAs, treasury oversight etc.
A key question is the regulation of "new" products, balancing protection against the value of fostering innovation. For example, how should an agency react to novel products such as payday loans or equity release mortgages where there may be uncertainty as to who will benefit? One possibility would be to apply a precautionary principle to a new product with an initial burden on credit providers to indicate the benefits of the product . The application of this principle to credit products might possibly have protected consumers against some of the initial problems with equity release products. There is always the danger here that existing firms may oppose new entrants (at least until they are able to determine whether it is worth developing the product).
The effectiveness of credit safety licensing depends on high quality information to identify potentially unsafe credit products and the ability to devise a regulation that can achieve an optimal level of safety without unnecessarily decreasing the availability of credit or innovation. Experience of consumer safety regulation indicates that private groups inevitably play an important role in information gathering and standard setting in regulation. Establishing product safety standards is a complex blend of technical expertise and responsiveness to political pressures The FSA is in a continuing dialogue with its stakeholders so that there is the potential to blend both technical expertise and political responsiveness.
The increasing use of broad standards such as responsible lending 98 also argue in favour of the FSA approach. A standard such as responsible lending is subject to the critique that it may increase costs (e.g. legal advice) and uncertainty for lenders which may in turn result in a hesitate to lend to more marginal credit risks. Reliance on private litigation to develop the concept of responsible lending suffers from several drawbacks; the difficulties of courts establishing useful standards to be applied within bureaucratic organizations: the reactivity and lack of expertise of courts, and knowledge about how to change organizational behaviour: the likelihood of being subject to the biases of the litigation strategies of repeat players. The experience of standard setting to protect bank loan guarantors illustrates these limitations. A public regulator will be in a better position to develop guidance, encourage the development of best practices within an industry and monitor the potentially changing nature of the concept of responsible lending.
Regulation is inevitably affected by the political climate towards regulation. It may be difficult for an agency to maintain a cautious approach during a market upswing. One method of compensating for this might be the UK supercomplaint procedure 99 which permits consumer groups 97 See s11 Enterprise Act 2002. Supercomplaints have been made in relation to ppi, home credit and credit card practices. 98 A form of responsible lending is implicit in article 5.6 of the 2008 EU Consumer Credit Directive currently being implemented in the UK. 99 Supra to require an agency to respond to a potential market problem, permitting such groups to set the regulatory agenda.
Does the UK structure provide a model for drawing on both public and private actors in the area of consumer credit and achieving efficient and fair markets through regulation which is both effective and accountable? This is an important contemporary question as scholars compare European and US approaches to regulation in a number of areas and the Obama administration propose an agency similar to the FSA. Further comparative analysis would be beneficial in this area although there are substantial difficulties in carrying out such research. 100 The UK model seems at first sight distinct from the stylised description of US consumer protection based on regulation through litigation, the central role of "lawyer entrepreneurs" and a culture of adversarial legalism 101 .
IV Conclusion
There are significant limits on consumers as " a market discipline" in credit markets, even if suitably responsibilized through financial literacy . There is therefore the need for greater controls on the supply side of the market in terms of regulating both fairness and the type and manner of product marketing. We have suggested that a suitably resourced FSA or OFT has the potential to meet this need. . Regulation promises greater fairness, perhaps slightly lower prices and greater choice for lower income consumers. Fairness within this approach does not however prevent the Poor from paying more than middle income consumers for credit. In addition, the ultimate objective of promoting confidence in an expanding market for credit assumes that the promotion of access even at very high prices rather than protection from credit is the starting point for analysis. The assumption that credit is "a good thing" will prevent any broad scale measures such as interest rate ceilings, or terms control which would dampen demand. Of course it is precisely this issue of how much credit is "a good thing" which is raised by the credit crunch.
Affordable access to credit for low income consumers, particularly for short term loans remains a problem. A recent history of working class credit concludes that "cheap credit remains elusive for the depressingly large number of families who still have to manage on limited budgets...unfortunately the liberalization of credit that accompanied the great leap into the consumer society has not produced a simple solution for the economic problems of the poorest groups. For them easy terms remain elusive." The UK government in response to the credit crunch is now promoting the mutual sector including building societies and credit unions as methods of providing and alternative to the mainstream banks. 102 Crowther noted in 1970 that "mutual aid ..." was not part of the British tradition in credit compared with the growth of credit unions in other countries." Historically, apart from building societies before they were demutualized, there has been a relative absence of non- market institutions providing credit. In the 19 th century private pawnbrokers were known as the poor man's bank and hire-purchase, moneylenders, and home collected credit provided working class credit.
We have the impression that the UK has tended to assume that its approach to credit and regulation reflects a more "modern" and rational approach than countries such as Germany and France. The credit crunch has clearly challenged that assumption and further comparative work within Europe may deepen our understanding of the nature and role of consumer credit and the effects of different forms of regulation. According to Crowther consumer protection legislation would primarily address market failure caused by information with licensing of creditors as both a control on unfairness and a limited distributional goal of protecting low income consumers who would have difficulties in protecting themselves through individual litigation. The Committee endorsed some risk and loss spreading in protections for defaulting debtors. The introduction of connected lender liability was justified partly by noting that "in considering which of two relatively innocent parties should bear the greater loss, it is much easier for the business creditor to do so than the individual debtor." The Committee was however concerned that this risk spreading should not go too far since it would result in the "good customer" subsidising the "bad customer". The Committee concluded that there was little that consumer protection policy could do for the poor except provide protection against hardships caused by repossession and the enforcement of judgments. Even here the committee was concerned that "every restriction on a creditor's remedy must be paid for". Fairness rather than subsidised redistribution was the objective.
The Committee did assume that consumer credit existed within the backdrop of a welfare state and that individuals should not have to meet basic needs by borrowing at interest rates over 100 per cent. This problem should be solved through "social welfare services rather than by the granting of loans at enormous interest rates" [para 6:6.6]. The subsequent CCA 1974 legitimised consumer credit. It would hopefully eliminate the fly by night from the market (through the licensing regime) and many large credit grantors supported the Act. Regulation was a pre-condition for the development of a mass market for consumer credit and the Act was enacted by a conservative government.
Between the 1970s and 2003 there was a transition from producerism to consumerism in politics so that increasingly it is the consumer who is conceptualised as the primary legitimator and beneficiary of policymaking. 105 The growth of secured and unsecured consumer credit was facilitated through the abolition of terms control on hire-purchase and the Bank of England "corset" on lending, the liberalization of housing finance and the ability to use home equity as a source of general financing. This "democratisation" of credit could be viewed as representing a neo-liberal vision of the empowered consumer with a right to choose---a project carried on by New Labour with its emphasis on 'extending choice for the many, not the few' [Blair, 2003] . David Harvey argues that these changes in financial services provision brought " more and more of a debt culture into the centre of a formerly staid British life" (Harvey, 2005: 61-62). There was also a growth in inequality during this period and consumer credit could substitute for relatively stagnant income growth. The "sub prime" market such as doorstep lending substantially increased during this period. Given the defining role attributed to consumption and consumerism in contemporary society, inequality in the price of access to consumption because of high credit costs takes on an increased salience and affordable access to credit has become an important -but tantalisingly difficult to achieve-objective.
During the decades of the 1980s and 1990s the redistributional aspects of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 were the least effective. Credit licensing was perceived to have failed to protect subprime consumers and the vague "extortionate credit bargain" provisions-regarded as a substitute for interest rate ceilings-were little protection against high credit prices in the sub-prime market. Leyson and Thrift documented the growth of financial exclusion in the 1990s as financial institutions withdrew from low income neighborhoods. Any reform proposals during this period were primarily deregulatory and a review of the Act in 1994 commented that "perhaps the greatest strength of the Act is that it does not seek to meet its objectives through interventionist actions such as interest rate capping or direct control of the substance of contracts. Rather it explicitly endorses freedom of contract within a framework designed to ensure openness: consumer protection is attained in large part through measures to ensure that full and truthful information about credit contracts is available to consumers". [OFT, 1994] The major beneficiaries of the Act were middle class consumers who used credit cards and could take advantage of the connected lender provisions of the Act to hold companies liable for defective purchases. The new Labour government promised in its 1997 manifesto to "get tough" with loan sharks and predatory lending practices, as well as modernise the Act.
In 2003 the White Paper on Consumer Credit stated that "consumer credit is central to the UK economy"(for consumer credit read "the financial services industry"). The government wanted to encourage an "open and fair credit market, where consumers can make fully informed decisions and businesses can compete aggressively on a fair and even basis" [para 1.69]. Fairness would be provided through a beefed up licensing regime, and a more consumer friendly unfairness test (replacing the extortionate credit bargain test) which could be applied by both courts and ombudsmen. One difference between Crowther and the White Paper of 2003 was the recognition in the latter document of over-indebtedness and financial inclusion as problems of social justice [para 1.70]. Education and better access to advice would address overindebtedness but on affordable credit the White Paper states merely that "We want low income consumers to have access to affordable credit" [para 1.70]. The regulatory impact analysis of the Act indicated that a major objective of the reforms was to protect "vulnerable consumers".
The government also developed in the early 2000s an ambitious combination of measures to prevent and treat overindebtedness. 106 The objectives included assuring affordable credit, embedding responsible lending through a new consumer credit regime, encouraging a savings culture to avoid overindebtedness, and the provision of high-quality debt advice. The 'keys to the achievement of these goals' included the development of financial capability among the population, increases in credit unions, the development of alternative forms of affordable credit, and the introduction of a stakeholder suite of savings products. In addition to the consumer credit reforms the government would tackle illegal moneylenders, improve data sharing to promote responsible lending, provide better debt advice, improve insolvency procedures through a Debt Relief Order for low-income individuals with no assets, reform Administration Orders and strengthen repayment schemes. These priorities were underpinned by the government's aim to both create an efficient credit market and to 'advance equity in line with the Government's wider social justice agenda'. 107 This is an ambitious agenda but the objective of affordable access has not yet been achieved.
108
One striking consequence of the introduction of the supercomplaint process in the Enterprise Act 2002 has been the extent to which the Competition Commission has become involved in analysing analysing sub-prime and low income credit markets. The Commission, operating within a neo-classical economic framework, has proposed substantial reforms to subprime lending practices in order to make these markets more competitive. 109 In general its interventions have required greater information provision, opportunities for price comparison and reduction in switching costs. For example, in the home lending market-primarily used by consumers in socio-economic groups D and E-the Commission proposed greater comparative information for borrowers to reduce switching costs. The main home lenders must also record information about borrowers with credit bureaux to permit good payers to have the opportunity to graduate to a lower cost loan. These reforms may make these markets more competitive -individuals will be able to choose between lenders offering loans at 200% rather than 300%--but they will still pay a high price for credit. The Commission considered carefully whether interest rate ceilings should be introduced but concluded that it might make short term loans less available.
The UK now has a dense and overlapping system of state and "soft law" regulation of consumer credit including an ex ante system of licensing for all credit providers. It is certainly not light touch and fits Braithwaite's model of "more capitalism, more regulation". The existence of licensing means that regulation does not depend on ex post individualised actions.
The UK initiatives indicate that substantial regulation is needed to ensure that credit markets are free and fair. These interventions promise greater fairness, perhaps slightly lower prices and greater choice for lower income consumers. Fairness within this approach does not however prevent the Poor from paying more than middle income consumers for credit. In addition, the ultimate objective of promoting confidence in an expanding market for credit assumes that the promotion of access rather than protection from credit should be the goals in the UK system. There will remain a significant subprime lending market of rent-to-own stores, payday loans, and moneylenders. The UK government assumption is that it is better for individuals to be within this stratified system of credit, with a chance of climbing the ladder of credit, than to be excluded because of controls on the supply side of credit through interest rate ceilings. A general defence of institutions such as home lending in the UK where low income individuals pay high prices for credit is that this form of credit is adjusted to the needs of these higher risk consumers who often need to miss payments because of disruptions in their lives. 110 Mainstream forms of credit such as credit cards could be more dangerous for home credit customers given the high default charges for missing payments.
Affordable access to credit for low income consumers, particularly for short term loans remains an intractable problem. The non-profit sector such as credit unions plays a modest role in providing credit for low income consumers in the UK. Current government policy views the development of the credit union sector and Community Development Finance Institutions as central to the provision of 107 in credit compared with the growth of credit unions in other countries. Historically, apart from building societies before they were demutualized, there has been a relative absence of non-market institutions providing credit. In the 19 th century private pawnbrokers were known as the poor man's bank and hire-purchase, moneylenders, and home collected credit provided working class credit. Scrutiny of the historical debates of attempts to regulate the price of credit indicates that there was always a concern that to do so would limit credit to the working classes. Jeremy Bentham's strictures against usury regulation seemed to have been influential.
Contrasting visions of consumer credit? The Case of France
Recent comparative studies argue that the French legal system is less consumerist 112 than the US and UK, and more willing to protect consumers from easy credit which is perceived to contribute to potential financial exclusion.
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The World Bank Doing Business project concludes that the French civilian tradition is less hospitable to facilitating credit ( a conclusion denied by French scholars!) and La Porta et al argue that the French civilian tradition is associated with an ideology of greater government ownership and centralised regulation than the common law.
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There are certainly significant differences between the UK and France in regulation of the consumer credit market. First the existence of interest rate ceilings in France means that there is much less possibility of a legitimate sub-prime credit industry of payday loans, and very high cost lending. Second, credit reporting is operated by a public agency, the Bank of France, and is limited to providing creditors with "negative" information on debtors. Third, there were restrictions on the ability of individuals to use homes as a source of equity finance. This was partly altered in 2006 by the introduction of the "hypotheque rechargeable"
115 ---intended to facilitate home equity credit for consumption ---but there has been little uptake of this form of borrowing. 116 Consumer protection rules differ somewhat from the UK-the most significant being a cooling off period of 7 days after the "offer prealable"-but a close scrutiny of these regulations does not support the argument that, absent the usury ceilings, they are significantly more protective than the UK. « Le constituant peut alors l'offrir en garantie, dans la limite de la somme prévue dans l'acte constitutif et mentionnée à l'article 2423, non seulement au créancier originaire, mais aussi à un nouveau créancier encore que le premier n'ait pas été payé. « La convention de rechargement qu'il passe, soit avec le créancier originaire, soit avec le nouveau créancier, revêt la forme notariée 116 French housing finance is unique in its use of guarantees rather than mortgages by financial institutions. The process 117 The 2007 Economic and Social Council report on over-indebtedness claims that consumer protection in France for debtors is more protective than the Anglo-Saxon approach. The report identifies usury regulations, the 7 day cooling off period, the possibility of obtaining a delay in payment, the protection attached to a credit larger cooperative banking sector in France. Finally, over-indebted consumers have a range of public and private alternatives in England and Wales for which they must generally pay a fee, whereas in France there appears to be a single gateway for the over-indebted consumer. This is the process managed by the Bank of France which runs the network of over-indebtedness commissions in each department and which provide a free service to consumers.
In 2004 outstanding consumer credit per capita was 2,200 euro in France and 4,400 euro in the UK. Younger individuals and those on modest incomes have less access to consumer credit in France than the UK. 118 There are substantially lower numbers of credit cards in France. However there is an initial apparent paradox because about 180,000 individuals in France annually make applications to the over-indebtedness commissions established by the Bank of France whereas in England and Wales a substantially smaller number of individuals apply for bankruptcy or an Individual Voluntary Arrangement. 119 This apparent paradox is explicable by the absence of the many private debt management programmes which exist in England with estimates of 150,000 debt management plans being commenced annually.
Concerns were raised that French consumers are "under-indebted" and that this has had a detrimental effect on the growth of the French economy. In 2006 a French Senate Report raised the question whether consumer credit made too limited a contribution to economic growth 120 . The
Bourdin report argued that public policy since the 1980s had been focused on over-indebtedness and protection from debt. This resulted in an over-cautious approach to credit granting with the consequence that some individuals did not get access to credit. The Canivet report on the hypotheque generale saw it as a method of promoting credit to groups which might not traditionally obtain credit. Bourdin argued that the costs of limiting credit included the loss of growth which is linked to economic growth and employment, the costs to the individual of being refused credit and the distributive injustice of those with deposits in banks who finance low cost credit for better off individuals 121 . Bourdin proposed a more liberal regime for accessing home equity, and opening a debate on positive credit reporting and existing usury restrictions.
Subsequently the French government did make it easier for individuals to use their homes as security for ordinary credit purchases and greater use of consumer credit is advocated but without the problems of "Anglo-Saxon" over-indebtedness. However the credit crunch seems to have resulted in a backlash against consumer credit, particularly revolving credit.. The implementation of the 2008 European Consumer Credit Directive has provided the French government with the opportunity of making some modest further reforms of consumer credit law including a mandatory information obligation on consumer credit products that "Un crédit vous engage et doit être remboursé". 122 The introduction of positive credit reporting has once again been raised 123 .
sale, the transparency and information obligations on the cost of credit, and regulation of revolving credit in 2005 providing greater disclosure and the requirement of an "offer prealable" if the creditor wishes to increase the consumer's credit limit. The Council recommended that borrowers should be provided with a "Coeur du contract" disclosure. The differences between the UK and France are emblematic of differences within the EU in approaches to consumer credit and tensions between neo-liberalism and a social market approach. On one hand a primary goal of EU policy in recent years has been to foster a competitive and integrated European credit and financial services market. This is part of the Lisbon agenda. Examples include the payments directive, 124 the Green paper on retail financial services 125 and several actions brought by DG Competition concerning credit card services and state subsidies of financial services providers that might inhibit access by competing firms. 126 The recent EU Consumer Credit Directive 127 is primarily concerned with achieving a more competitive credit market and adopts a targeted full harmonisation approach to those issues that are intended to facilitate cross border competition in credit: standardised pre-contractual information and calculation of the APR, a 14 day right of withdrawal, and rules on early repayment. It does not view the current directive as part of "the fight against overindebtedness". 128 However the Commission (through different DGs) has initiated projects to develop a common definition of over-indebtedness and to study financial exclusion 129 and a recent report proposes that financial services should be viewed as services of general interest and that as part of the European model of society all individuals should have affordable access.
